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INDUSTRY: A GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIR?!
Truijens, Onno, University of Amsterdam Business School, Roetersstraat 11, 1018 WB
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, O.Truijens@uva.nl

Abstract
The Electronic Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Malone, Yates & Benjamin 1987) holds that electronic
markets will eventually evolve towards unbiased markets under the pressure of both competitive and
legal forces and that this process is inevitable in case of markets for commodities. Based on an initial
literature review, we criticise the EMH for its definitional impreciseness, its disregard for strategic
and technological counter forces and the absence of market characteristics as contingent factors in
the prediction. These critiques drive our research interest in the nature and effectiveness of the
competitive and legal forces that are held to be crucial in the evolution towards unbiased markets, in
particular in the light of the regulatory authorities that are often installed to institutionalize these
forces. In this paper we present our ongoing research that intends to nuance the, in our opinion,
overly optimistic and naïve view of the EMH by examining the Dutch electricity industry as an
example of a commodity market that has recently been liberalised. Specifically, we examine the nature
and effectiveness of the regulatory transparency increasing measures of the DTe (Office of Energy
Regulation) from the perspective of the DTe and the comparison websites that these measures are
aimed at. Preliminary results indicate that even in markets for commodities, competitive measures
have to be complemented with a proactive ‘information authority’ to enforce the ‘inevitable’ evolution
towards unbiased, transparent electronic markets.
Keywords: electronic markets hypothesis, informational transparency, regulatory measures,
electricity industry.
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INTRODUCTION

Malone, Yates and Benjamin’s (1987) classic exposé on the emergence and evolution of electronic
markets discerns a gradual three-staged progress of electronic markets (biased-unbiased-personalized).
Based on coordination theory (Malone 1987), they argue an overall shift towards proportionately more
market-based coordination. This prediction, come to known as the electronic markets hypothesis
(EMH), has proven to be extremely valuable as a guiding principle in (economic) research concerning
electronic markets, e-business and (dis)intermediation (see Urbaczewski, Jessup & Wheeler (2002)
and Kauffman & Walden (2001) for overviews). Nevertheless, the EMH in its original publication is
far from sanctifying: it is slightly optimistic, if not naïve, little nuanced. Surprisingly, the EMH has
evoked relatively little theoretical follow-up and conclusive empirical evidence for it fails to be
discovered (e.g. Hess & Kemerer 1994). While some researchers (e.g. Bakos 1998, Granados, Gupta
& Kauffman 2006a) have added to the explanatory/predictive strength of the EMH, the predominant
theoretical perspective is transaction cost economics (TCE). This has led to clarifications of issues
such as consumer lock-in and switching costs, barriers to entry and reduced power for suppliers and
the overall effect on price levels (e.g. Bakos 1997, Steinfield, Chan & Kraut 2000, Wigand &
Benjamin 1995). However, the presumed forces that drive the transition from biased to unbiased
markets, in particular the forces that relate to the required informational transparency of unbiased
markets have been neither satisfactorily elaborated in theory, nor been subject to empirical testing. We
aim to further the current understanding of the evolution of electronic markets by focusing on this
issue in particular.
The EMH holds that in the transition from biased to unbiased markets: “producers who start out by
providing an electronic hierarchy or a biased electronic market will eventually be driven by
competitive or legal forces to remove or significantly reduce the bias” (Malone et al. 1987, p.492,
emphasis added). Even though these forces are often clearly exemplified, their theoretical nature is yet
to be fully understood, specifically when it comes to the forces that are held to increase the
informational transparency of electronic markets. In addition, their implementation and subsequent
effects are not unequivocal. In general, it is believed that if competition is stimulated, increased
transparency will follow by itself. A more profound understanding of these forces will not only
increase our understanding of the EMH, it is also a prerequisite for regulatory authorities to effectively
design and implement measures to enhance the transparency of electronic markets in their objective to
establish unbiased, or ‘frictionless’ markets in an industry. In this paper, we tentatively pose that a
proactive ‘information authority’ that regulates and controls an industry’s transparency level is
required for the evolution towards unbiased markets to occur. Our research question is twofold: (1)
what is the nature of the competitive and legal forces that are aimed at increasing a market’s
transparency? (2) To what extent are regulatory authorities effective in instituting such transparencyincreasing measures? The research will addresses these questions by means of a literature review and
an exploratory case study in the Dutch electricity industry.
In this paper, we first provide the results of our initial review of the literature in the form of three
critiques of the EMH. We then present our approach to the empirical study in the Dutch electricity
industry. We conclude by discussing some preliminary results of the research.
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A CRITIQUE OF THE ELECTRONIC MARKET HYPOTHESIS

Given the tremendous impact and daringness of the EMH, criticizing it resembles committing
sacrilege. As a precaution, we therefore re-emphasize our intention to further develop and nuance it.
Nevertheless, based on our initial review of the literature, we criticize the EMH for 1) its lack of
definitional preciseness for the concept of unbiased market, 2) its disregard for technological and
strategic inhibitors in specifying the transitional forces from biased to unbiased markets, and 3) the
absence of specific market characteristics as contingent factors in the predicted evolution to unbiased
markets.
2.1

Definitional impreciseness

In the two core contributions (1987, 1989) that have put the EMH on the map, the staged evolution of
electronic markets has been predicted with mediocre preciseness in its definitions. To begin with, the
evolutionary market stages are ill defined in the sense that characteristics of the three stages are not
discussed but merely given a general feel for by providing classical examples (typically the Baxter or
Sabre case). More specifically, the concept of unbiased market is unclear. The few publications that do
elaborate on this definition (e.g. Steinfeld 2000, on frictionless markets) do so by drawing solely on
TCE. As a result, it remains unclear to what extent informational transparency is in fact a necessary
condition for the existence of unbiased markets, and which other conditions also apply. In general, the
extent to which Malone et al. appeal to economic theory on the ‘perfect’, or economically efficient,
market is uncertain. The partial overlap in theoretical conditions of unbiased markets and
economically efficient markets seems obvious: the perfect information assumption1 should apply in
order for transparent, informationally efficient, unbiased markets to exist. However, Malone et al. do
not refer explicitly to efficient market theory, nor do they link its theoretical assumptions to their
characterization of the three market stages. A similar critique of impreciseness applies to the
transitional forces that Malone et al. describe. The staged evolution of electronic markets does not
occur autonomously: transitional forces, such as competitive and legal forces (1987, p.492) will drive
the change from biased to unbiased markets. The nature of the competitive forces is partly explained:
buyers will benefit so significantly from the electronic brokerage effect that they will drive suppliers
to remove their bias. While this force relies heavily on the market power of buyers, it nevertheless
reveals part of the nature of the competitive forces; something, which cannot be said of the legal forces
that are believed to be of importance. Again, these legal forces are merely exemplified (with the
classic American Airlines example), not theoretically underpinned.
We believe this definitional impreciseness to be one of the reasons that “in the 10 years that have
passed since the publication of the Malone et al. (1987) article, there have been few attempts to test the
hypotheses” (Daniel & Klimis 1999, p.321). Moreover, the attempts that have been undertaken show
very little evidence for the evolution to unbiased markets to occur: Steinfield (2000) concludes that “it
is not altogether clear that electronic markets are indeed frictionless”, while Daniel et al. (1999) find
no evidence of unbiased markets in the retail financial services and the music industry, and Hess et al.
(1994) conclude from their case studies that “at least five major economic agents have offered CLO’s2,
yet none exists today as a pure electronic market as suggested by the hypothesis”. We suggest the
theoretical conditions of unbiased markets and the two transitional forces should be clarified, in

1

The perfect information assumption holds when all economic actors instantly have complete and perfect information about
all relevant aspects of market transactions and production, exchange and distribution activities, including market
opportunities, available technology, cost of production under alternative productive arrangements, the quality of the goods
produced and, critically, the intentions of their fellow actors; and any new information is instantly disseminated to all market
parties at no cost (Truijens & Huizing 2005, p.7).
2
Computerized Loan Origination systems
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particular with respect to the aspect of informational transparency in order to raise the theoretical
status of the EMH and to ease the empirical identification of different market stages in practice.
2.2

Disregarding inhibitors

Our second critique relates to the nature of the transitional forces. We believe that Malone et al.
overemphasize the positive forces that lead to unbiased markets. They disregard (or underestimate) at
least two counter forces that hamper removing the biases from electronic markets: technological
inhibitors and vested strategic interests of market parties around information asymmetries. First, while
IT is undeniably becoming increasingly pervasive in most industries, some industries are lagging in
the dissemination of information systems over all market parties, particularly industries with large
numbers of smaller suppliers, where profit margins are thin and IT investments are prohibitive for
some individual market parties (as for example in the Dutch travel industry (Truijens 2004, p.264).
Alternatively, the existing IT infrastructure itself might have a lagging effect on the evolution to
unbiased markets (as for instance in the airline industry). Legacy systems might be unsuited for realtime concurrent access that comparison websites require and costly (third-party) solutions (e.g. Orbitz)
need to be developed first (Granados, Gupta & Kauffman 2006b, p.12). Second, the strategic
imperatives of information asymmetries play an important role as a counter force in the evolution
towards unbiased markets (Grover & Ramanlal 1999, Zhu 2002). As long as opaque market
mechanisms exist (e.g. bidding) and information advantages are a source of economic rents in opaque
markets (Truijens 2004), suppliers will have a strong incentive to deter unbiased markets. Their
options range from actively boycotting unbiased market initiatives by not taking part in them or not
providing information that is crucial for such initiatives to become a success (e.g. net prices, in-stock
information), to initiating their own biased market initiatives placing themselves in a position to
manipulate or confuse the outcomes of comparisons or to ask user fees (Bakos 1991, p.302). In
addition, theoretical explanations, such as Clemons’ (2003) ‘move to the middle’ hypothesis and six
counter-myths of information and markets (Grover et al. 1999), seek to explain the economic rationale
behind suppliers’ efforts to hamper the removal of biases from electronic markets (see also Granados,
Gupta & Kauffman (2005b, p.4-5) for an overview of ‘quasi market theories’). We advocate that the
EMH needs to take these strategic and technological counter forces into account in order to nuance its
overly optimistic hypothesis on the evolution of electronic markets.
2.3

Absence of contingent factors

Our third critique concerns the implied generality that the EMH contains: the predicted evolution to
unbiased markets should apply uniformly to all electronic markets. Malone et al. only partly cover
themselves by stating that markets evolve in different tempi. However, empirical research in the
mortgage industry, retail financial services and the music industry (see 2.1) shows that especially
markets for differentiated products do not evolve as anticipated, leading to the conclusion that “either
the results predicted by the EMH require a longer gestation period or that the underlying hypothesis
will require augmentation” (p.252). We strongly believe the latter is the case, since even over decade
of patience has not led to significantly different outcomes in this industry. More specifically, we agree
with the opinion (Bakos 1991, Granados, Gupta & Kauffman 2005a) that certain market properties
such as its type (commodity of differentiated product) and (micro)structure3 (Spulber 1999) are
important contingency variables for the EMH. In markets for differentiated products, suppliers have a
range of options to prevent markets from becoming transparent, for instance by engaging in extensive
product differentiation, or by employing price discrimination or bundling to inhibit product and price
3

Market microstructure is defined as the set of market participants, institutions and mechanisms that enable trade. It
emphasizes that firms make explicit decisions to select trading prices and coordinate transactions that support exchange
(Granados et al. 2005a, p.5).

4

comparisons. Similarly, in markets with limited information disclosure by suppliers, a difficult price
discovery by buyers and complex trading protocols, suppliers have the opportunity to deter the
evolution towards unbiased transparent markets. Therefore, we emphasize that if we recognize
markets to differ significantly in terms of their type and their microstructures, we should also
recognize that these differences not only impact a market’s transaction costs, but also on its probability
to evolve towards unbiased and transparent markets. In our opinion Malone et al. have overlooked this
subtlety in their hypothesis and more research is required to understand the exact influence of these
two contingency variables.
Inspired by the research opportunities of our initial literature review, our intended research will focus
on the nature of the competitive and legal forces that are held responsible for the evolution towards
unbiased markets in commodity markets. It is stated that under the pressure of these forces in
commodity markets, electronic markets will inevitably destabilize profitable monopolistic outcomes,
thereby reducing seller profits and increasing buyer welfare (Bakos 1991). However, “the writings on
the effect of information technology on market structure have largely ignored the role of government
regulation” (Hess et al. 1994, p.271). In order to institute these forces in practice, regulatory
authorities can be appointed that design and implement a set of measures to increase a market’s level
of competition and transparency. In general, it is believed that increased competition will lead to a
higher level of informational transparency in a market, while Møllgaard and Overgaard (2001) show
the opposite can also be the case in their study of the Danish concrete industry. Competitionenhancing measures (e.g. privatisation, liberalization of market access) have been extensively
discussed and evaluated in the Industrial Organization Economics literature and tested in policies in
practice. However, the nature and rationale of regulatory measures aimed directly at enhancing a
market’s transparency are less clear. How can such measures effectively deal with the counter forces
that deter unbiased markets? Should regulatory authorities employ these transparency measures, or
will ‘invisible’ market forces autonomously drive the market towards unbiased? Our aim in this
research is to clarify the nature and effectiveness of regulatory transparency-increasing measures in
commodity markets by means of an exploratory case study in the Dutch electricity industry.

3

RESEARCH APPROACH AND STATUS

In order to grasp the above research opportunity, we will first extend our initial literature review to reexamine the ostensible gap in the literature from the original Malone et al. article and the subsequent
work that elaborates the EMH. Furthermore, a literature review will be aimed at policy literature
around deregulation and transparency, in particular with a focus on the electricity industry. The
literature review will be complemented by an exploratory case study in the Dutch electricity industry.
In 1998 (installation of the Electricity law), the decontrolling of the electricity industry was initiated
under the auspices of regulatory authority DTe (Office of Energy Regulation) and various measures
were, and are still being, installed to increase the level of competition and transparency. Some of these
measures have been aimed at the electricity comparison websites. In the case study, we analyse the
nature of and rationale behind the transparency increasing measures, and their effects from the
perspective of the DTe and the comparison websites that currently exist.
Our choice for a qualitative approach to this study is led by the nature of the research questions posed
and the observed weaknesses in theoretical grounding in the EMH. We find the case study research
strategy appropriate for studying transparency regulation in the electricity industry for we attempt to
illuminate a set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented and with what result
(Schramm 1971) and the main research question is a ‘how’ question (Yin 1994). Furthermore, case
studies can be effectively employed for building theory (Eisenhardt 1989) that explains the nature and
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effect of the competitive and legal forces in the evolution towards unbiased markets, including the
possible counter forces.
The rationale behind selecting the Dutch electricity sector as the focal industry in this research is
twofold. The first and foremost reason for this industry is that electricity is often mentioned as an
exemplar of a commodity product for it satisfies the key characteristics of being an undifferentiated
product with uniform quality, produced in large quantities by many different producers resulting in an
equivalent product. In the EMH, the evolution towards unbiased markets is held to be inevitable in
markets for commodity products. Therefore, should Malone’s et al. prediction in fact be correct, it
would be noticeable in prima facie in markets for commodities. Since the start of the deregulation in
1998 and the enforcement of free choice of electricity supplier for consumers in July 2004, several
web-based initiatives that compare the products and prices of Dutch electricity suppliers have indeed
emerged. Their appearance and intention to increase the market’s transparency for consumers
indicates that the market indeed has had biases. Now, after over a year of gestation period, we believe
it is reasonable to expect that the transparency-increasing influence of these comparison websites
should have a noticeable effect of removing at least some biases from the market. If not, we have
reason to doubt and thus enhance the core logic underlying the predicted evolution towards unbiased
market. The second reason is that the Dutch electricity industry provides a unique opportunity for
investigating all parties involved, because we can benefit from the ease of surveyability of the
industry. An investigation commanded by the DTe (2004) revealed that the 13 URL’s of comparison
websites relied on just 5 data and calculation engines. Meanwhile, a take-over purchase by one of the
engines (gaslicht.com) and a discontinuation of another (energievergelijken.nl) have brought down the
number of comparison engines to 3. This allows us to be complete in our case selection on the side of
the comparison engines and to include gaslicht.com, energieplaza.nl and energieprijzen.nl.
The design of the case study can be characterized in spirit of Yin (1994) and Stake (2000) as a
collective, exploratory, idiographic, multiple holistic case study consisting of 4 cases. The primary
data source in the study is interviews held with managing directors/project managers at the case sites.
By now, the managing directors of all three comparison engines have committed themselves to
cooperating fully in the research and in-depth interviews with two of them have already been
conducted. In addition, we have been able to collect background information from the initiator of the
discontinued comparison engine in order to enlighten the main reason behind his decision to quit. On
the side of the regulatory authority DTe, the initial contact has been made with the project manager
that is responsible for the quality assessments of electricity comparison websites, however interviews
at the DTe have yet to be conducted. In the near future, we hope to extend the scope of the research to
include the three largest energy suppliers, as possible additional counter forces in the evolution
towards unbiased markets.
The focus and topics of the semi-structured interviews is derived from the EMH framework depicted
in figure 1. After the EMH is shortly introduced to the interviewee they are asked to reflect on and
exemplify the stages that the EMH discerns as well as the reality of the evolution towards unbiased
markets and the driving forces from their individual perspective. The interview then focuses on the
regulatory measures that are currently implemented and their effect within the interplay of forces.
Interviews are recorded, transcribed and sent to the interviewee for review and corrections before the
data analysis phase. Any available documentation, research reports, news articles, company
information from brochures and websites are collected to complement the interview data. All data will
then be coded using Atlas.ti as a tool for qualitative data analysis in order to facilitate cross-case
analysis in the final research report.
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Scope of research and focus of interviews

PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The preliminary results in this study indicate that the market for electricity is in fact biased and the
competitive and legal forces that should aid the removal of these biases are existent, respectively in the
form of electricity comparison websites and the regulatory authority DTe. However, their expected
influence in prospering the evolution towards unbiased markets is questionable, while, given the
EMH, it should be unmistakeable given the fact that electricity is an economic commodity with low
product complexity and low asset specificity.
The comparison websites that currently exist are unable to make the market fully transparent and thus
unbiased. Partly, this is caused by the complexity of the tariff structure of energy products (i.e.
numerous levy’s, surcharges and taxes for fixed and variable parts of the tariff), partly because some
suppliers, typically the three largest suppliers Nuon, Eneco and Essent, are hesitant to disclose their
tariff information and/or pass on changes instantly to the comparison websites. Also, some energy
suppliers make special offers for products that are only valid if bought via a particular comparison
website, thus influencing (read: biasing) the outcome of the comparison in their favour. A possible
explanation for these biases still to exist is that the earnings model of comparison websites is based
completely on energy suppliers, either by a monthly fee or a fee per switch-over, and additional
earnings from ads on the website. The supplier-based source of these earnings could make it difficult
for comparison websites to pressure suppliers to remove their biases, and to disclose their correct tariff
information on time, even when claiming that their ultimate objective is to provide a correct overview
and comparison of all tariffs.
Whether the DTe is in fact in a position to remove these biases has yet to be investigated in more
depth. However at first sight, the DTe seems to be limited in its ability to legally enforce increased
market transparency and to remove existing market biases. Currently, the focus of their attention and
regulatory measures are aimed at improving the quality of existing comparison websites. After an
initial inspection of the quality of their information and calculations and the completeness and
independency of comparisons, the DTe now intends to repeat these inspections up to 4 times a year.
They, however, lack the legal measures to impose fines or enforce the compliance of comparison
websites in case of any inadequacies. At the moment, the DTe has no intention to initiate their own,
truly independent, comparison website, nor are they willing to sponsor or promote the comparison
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website that is considered the best in their inspection. Not surprisingly, the comparison websites are
benevolent towards the DTe, for their inspection provides free advice on where and how to improve
their comparisons. Nevertheless, they feel that the DTe is barking up the wrong tree and should
address the transparency-inhibiting practices of electricity suppliers (specifically the three largest
suppliers) as well as address the complexity of the tariff structure.
Overall, it seems that to rely only on competitive forces to increase market transparency and to create
an unbiased market in this industry is mainly a test of faith and patience. Strategic inhibitors to
unbiased markets are a counter force, which can not be assumed to simply vanish in the evolution of
electronic markets. The assumptions that IT networks will benefit buyers for instance through
increased product customisation, increased outsourcing, reduced supplier dependency, multiple linked
markets, expanded customer bases, and low-price guarantees in fact seem to be myths of the effective
market (Grover et al. 1999). Particularly, when the legal forces are not in place, or insufficiently
equipped to enforce truly fair competition and fully open information disclosure. Even when it
concerns commodity markets, the EMH seems to be overly optimistic about the power of competitive
forces and the effectiveness of regulatory transparency increasing measures. In our opinion, the
EMH’s prediction that unbiased markets will occur can only be proven to hold for markets with
commodity products if a proactive ‘information authority’ functions in addition to the normal
regulatory measures (e.g. anti-trust, anti-monopoly). If not, market parties that have no interest in
increased market transparency will easily find ways to de-commoditize the market, for instance
through extensive product differentiation or price discrimination. We advocate to include these and
other nuances in the EMH in order to raise its explanatory power.
Finally, we stress again that we do not intend to prove that the EMH is fundamentally flawed. On the
contrary we praise Malone’s prediction for it provocative nature, given the time that it was made in.
We hope that the nuances that this research aims to add to the EMH will enhance our thinking about
the economic effects that we can realistically expect to occur in the evolution of electronic markets.
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